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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiftfAppellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOSEPH GALLEGOS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990531-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal isfroma judgment and conviction of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(1) & (4)(c) (Supp. 1999) (in Add. A).1 This Court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the plea bargain reached between the State and co-defendant violate
defendant's state constitutional right to call witnesses on his behalf at trial?

defendant was also convicted of interfering with an arresting officer, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999), but does not challenge
that conviction or sentence in this appeal.
Further, section 58-37-8 was amended in 1999, after the offense at issue occurred.
However, those changes do not affect the determination of this case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Because defendant raises this issue for thefirsttime on appeal and fails to argue
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, his claim does not warrant appellate
review and no standard of review applies.
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that defendant
possessed the methamphetamine and that the officers could see defendant's conduct in the
dark?
Because defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal and fails to argue
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, his claim does not warrant appellate
review and no standard of review applies.
3. Has defendant met his burden of showing that his trial counsel performed
deficiently in not calling defendant's sister-in-law or another police suspect to testify to
peripheral and cumulative matters at trial?
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Maestas, 2000
UT App 22,111, 997 P.2d 314; State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App.
1998); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). Where, as here, the record is
insufficient to permit review, the claim is not reviewed on appeal and no standard of
review applies. See State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, f 13, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 15.

(
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CONSTITUTIONAL Fku

Tin luiliiiM. im> n uii'ililulinii.ii pirn i IIKIIIS -ire ivin am to the issues on appeal:
Utah Const a r t 1, § *-.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before 'final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
U.S. Const, amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASK
Defendant s\d> dliai^ui n • 11 • (HISMNMOII ol m
, n ontmllnl iiilistann v^. if li I he iiilcni lo
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) & (4)(c)
(Supp. 1999), and interfering with an airesting officer, a class B misdemeanor : r
violation of Utah Code Mm

JU5(19^

day trial, the

IDAUU

^ fendant filed multiple
3
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pro-se motions challenging his trial counsel's effectiveness and the veracity of the State's
witnesses (R. 35-38, 112-14, 119-20, 126-28, 129-39, 155-56, 167-68, 169-72). All
motions were denied, and the trial court sentenced defendant to serve five-years-to-life
for the first degree felony and 180 days for the class B misdemeanor (R. 160-61).
Defendant timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Melissa Melcher began working the comer of 25th and Monroe Streets
shortly before nine p.m. the evening of June 20, 1998 (R. 228:10, 12, 23, 68).2 She was
part of a group of five officers working a reverse prostitution sting aimed at those who
solicit prostitutes (R. 228:11, 22, 67). As part of the operation, Melcher was wearing a
wire which allowed an officer waiting in one of the two unmarked police vehicles nearby
to hear her conversations with others (R. 228:22, 27-28, 70). When she was ready for the
officers to appear and make an arrest, she would give a pre-arranged "bust signaP'-saying
"Father's Day" and removing her pursefromher shoulder (R. 228:16-17).
It was still daylight around 9:15 p.m. when Darlene Lucero approached Melcher
(R. 228:12, 24-25). Lucero asked if Melcher was a snitch, then proceeded to offer
"protection" services to Melcher (R. 228: 14, 29, 58-59, 69). Lucero then asked if
Melcher knew of anyone wanting to buy methamphetamine (R. 228:12, 30). Melcher said

2

Transcripts are cited by the volume number stamped on the cover of each
transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 277: 7.
4
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"no" but she was interested in buying a "teener" for herself (R. 228:

Lucero

agreed, but said that she would have to get
JfifersiiHii i K VS I J> Ui» sin* said she'd be back in fifteen minutes or Melcher could
find her at 26th and Jefferson (R. 228:12).
The sting operation continued, but Lucero did not return (R. 228 3.v

he

officers eventually decided to relocate In (lit i unit i of Ni,h ,m<l Idfn villi i
36 3 7. 71 98) Fifteen minutes later, as it was beginning to get dark, Melcher saw Lucero
and defendant coming toward her down the opposite side of the street a block away (R.
228:14, 26-27, 38-39). When they reached Melcher, she was already talking to a man
i Ii : • A as also iiiterested mi litis mil1 ii Icnin nli R ,??K'3 "• W ' I I Melcher asked about the
i •*,.-. and Lucero asked defendant if they should sell Melcher two teeners (R. 228:14-15,
43).

Defendant agreed to the sale, and, at Lucero's urging, the group walked a short

distance down the block, away from a streetlight (K
s t o p p e d (lit

,L»I

mi III I IIII Ml |i i

II

! (

ii il,i i ii I I if,' t v u i ( i h c

" ' " \ I M "», 0(«

,! i \\ I c I I 11

involved in the reverse sting

operation, saying she wanted to get the deal done so she could attend to business (R.
228:15, 44. 74) Defendant agreed to do it there, commenting to Lucero, "Stop making
such a commotion and attracting all
Defendant opened the black fanny pack hanging at the front of his waist, pulled two

A teener" is a small amount of drugs for personal use, generally worth about
$20.00 (R. 228:31-32).
5
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baggies of methamphetamine out, and gave them both to Lucero (R. 228:15, 42, 45-46).
While the pack was open, Melcher saw several more baggies in it, all resembling the ones
defendant had removed (R. 228:46-47). Lucero held up the baggies and flicked them
with her fingers (R. 228:15, 46, 74). Melcher gave the pre-arranged "bust signal" (R.
228:15,48).
Detective Steve Zaccardi and Officer Wayne Smith were in the unmarked car next
to Melcher and her group (R. 228:74-75, 127). From his position in the front seat of the
car, Zaccardi observed defendant and Lucero approach Melcher and the unknown male,
saw the group walk toward the car and stop right next to it, then saw Lucero holding up
the baggies (R. 228:72-74). He did not see how the individuals were dressed because of
the darkness and the streetlight behind them; his position prevented him from seeing
where Lucero got the baggies (R. 228:98-102). As he watched, he listened to the
conversation on Melcher's wire (R. 228:72-74).
Officer Smith was writing a citation in the back seat of the unmarked car with a
suspect they had arrested earlier (R. 228:75, 127). He was approximately four feet from
defendant and could see defendant take something out of a fanny pack he wore and hand
it to a female (R. 228:129-30, 133-34). He heard a male voice say that they would do the
deal (R. 228:134).
When Lucero held up the baggies, both officers stepped out of the car (R. 228:76).
Zaccardi drew his gun, identified himself, and told the group to get on the ground (R.

6
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228:49, 76). Defendant ran (R. :. *

oth Zaccardi and Smiu

R.

2 2 X 7 f> " 1 \ I ni il I n ni i\ I • \ i 'i I i ni i ni i ni iidentified man with Melcher ran in another direction,
and Melcher yelled at Smith to follow him (R. 228:51-52, 131). Seeing the officers were
busy, Lucero started to walk in another direction but was stopped by Melcher and arrested
(R. 228:18).
i diT.iid Ii '-I ili ii'.l I. f'lti •mil followed defendant (R. 228:76, 84). As they ran,
Zaccardi noticed defendant making broad gestures with his arms, moving them toward his
waistband then out again, as if he might have a weapon (R. 228:85, 1Q5-06). However, it
was dark by this time so that the detective could i

Pendant's

inovmk'iits K , / K ill i ^ >»,, S?,60,98, 103). Zaccardi followed defendant from no •
more than 25 feet away (R. 228:104-05). Defendant stepped in a hole and fell near a curb
(R. 228:77, 106). Zaccardi reached him as he was getting up, pushed him down and tried
to subdue him as he actively resisted (K 228" ? ' /H lllliii \ '-rumd nlfu'i r arrived
together they cuffed defendant (R. 228:77, 84, 107). Zaccardi then noticed the fanny
pack (R. 228:85).
They took defendant back to the unmarked car, and Melcher asked 4 " doi .n ill I I v
I i Il lounJ moi ' IlKiggic,1'. inn the fanny pack (R, 228:18, 86, 108). Zaccardi reported that
the pack was empty (R. 228:86, 108). Melcher insisted that she had seen them, so the
officers took their flashlights and retraced their steps, finding two baggies of
methamphetamine along the path defendant had

7
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Meanwhile, Melcher had found the baggies Lucero had been holding on the ground
where the group had stopped to conduct the sale (R. 228: 18, 86-87).
Melcher took defendant to the hospital to be treated for various small lacerations
and pains, and then took him to jail for booking (R. 228:52-54). She filled out the
necessary paperwork concerning defendant's personal property but did not list the black
fanny pack as it was not there at that time (R. 228:55-56, 87). Zaccardi stayed at the
scene to prepare his written report, field tested the drugs at his office, then placed the
drugs into evidence (R. 228:86, 94, 112). He also had defendant's fanny pack, eyeglasses
and hat, but decided that they were not needed in evidence (R. 228:87). He drove the
items to the jail at three in the morning and left them to be put with defendant's other
belongings as defendant had already been booked and the paperwork completed (R.
228:87, 112, 114).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Prior to trial, defendant's co-defendant, Lucero, entered into a plea
agreement in which she agreed that, if called to testify at defendant's trial, she would say
that 'the version [of events] that the State has in the police reports is accurate as to her
involvement[.]" Defendant claims that this condition of the plea agreement violated his
right to compel a witness to testify in his behalf. This challenge does not warrant
appellate review because defendant failed to raise this objection below, depriving the trial
court of the opportunity to develop the record concerning the propriety of the agreement.

8
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<

Further, defendant fails to argue plain error on appeal. Even under the plain error
doctrine, defendant's claim of error fails because the terms oi flic .igttTitiail t!«i i i l
obviously requ

stand and lie. Moreover, to the extent

defendant challenges the State's ability to use a plea bargain to ensure truthful testimony,
his claim must fail because he has no right to present perjured testimony.
Point II

us Court should refuse to address defendant

evidence h a

argument to the trial court and does not argue

plain error on appeal Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict. Defendant was linked to the baggies of methamphetamine by: testimony from an
eyewitness who saw the baggies in a fanny pack defends
11 e f en da 111' ^ 11 a 11111« <\ ^ 11 e handed two baggies to his co-defendant; and testimony of
another eyewitness who saw defendant making arm gestures near the fanny pack at his
waist as he ran from the police; and testimony that immediately after defendant's arrest,
the officers located two more baggj
(a I

^fendant had

that there was some visibility even though it was dark at the time of

defendant's arrest was established by the consistent testimony of the officers as to their
ability to see that defendant was one of the people who met M ill I HI m < i I1 In, Ilk I u l l u l In
rm movements as he ran, and that he tripped in a
gutter and fell immediately prior to his arrest. Defendant confirmed that the darkness did
not wholly eliminate visibility when he testified that he could see Officer Melcher's body

9
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movements from a short distance away as well as the officers as they emergedfromthe
car parked at the curb. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the officers
could see the basic events about which they testified, despite the darkness.
Point III: Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails because
defendant does not establish the requisite prejudice arisingfromhis counsel's alleged
failure to investigate and call at trial two potential defense witnesses. Defendant makes
no prejudice argument as to one witness. The minimal argument he presents as to the
second witness fails to acknowledge that her proposed testimony would not negate an
element of the crime and would still require the jury to weigh conflicting evidence as to
the existence of the black fanny pack. In light of the substantial testimony against
defendant, it is not reasonably likely that the outcome would have been more favorable to
defendant had the witness testified.
Further, the record is inadequate to support the claims as it does not establish that
defendant's counsel conducted no investigation or that the witnesses would testify as
defendant speculates.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE
TO THE TERMS OF HIS CO-DEFENDANT'S PLEA BARGAIN AS
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT BELOW AND DOES NOT
ARGUE PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL; EVEN UNDER THE PLAIN
ERROR DOCTRINE, THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS ERROR
Defendant argues that he was denied his right to compel witnesses on his own
behalf by the State's plea bargain with his co-defendant, Darlene Lucero. Br. of Aplt. at
10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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1115. Specifically, he claims that by including in the plea agreement the requirement
thatif Lucero tpnk llu1 sland, slu >
' "i""Ui"U f«/\H«, • *• ii•, flu! tin p"(iu (t:poi1snnn ,iu mule,
the State effectively tampered with her testimony, thereby preventing her from testifying
on defendant's behalf about what happened that night. Br. of Aplt. at 12-15.4
Generally, claims not raised before the trial court, even constitutional ones may
not

.

->ee State v. Holeate, •

- *

104 Utah Aii\ Rep. 3;

State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998). An exception exists where plain error or
exceptional circumstances can be established. See Holgate, at Tfl 1. To establish plain
error, defendant must show that an error occurred, it should ha^
, u 111 ,i 11J 11 w i I M f i! 11111 • "

ii

• 11 •• i • i M the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more

favorable outcome for defendant. See id. at 1(13.
Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal, despite having
|
knowledge before trial of the terms of the plea bargain and jiiipli nppi >IMIMH •' «»««)>!»)r<t

.1" vs 2, S-6-defense i otiose! was present at Lucero's change of plea hearing and ' •
acknowledges defendant's intent up to that time to rely on Lucero's testimony at trial;
236:3-4-defendant admits discussing Lucero's plea with counsel but makes no objection).
I! I it la i k ml i in ni ili|t"* liiiii i in 11 In (III III in I mi ni ill (I (I mimimi 1 (ill I lie opportune
regarding the veracity of the anticipated testimony and the propriety of the agreement.

4

Defendant presents only a state constitutional argument, invoking Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution involving compelling the attendance of witnesses.
Br of Aplt at 14-15.
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Further, defendant fails to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
Accordingly, this Court should refuse to review his claim of error on appeal. See State v.
BeUo, 871 P.2d 584, 587-88, n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to reach a constitutional
claim for the first time on appeal absent a plain error argument).
Even under the plain error doctrine, defendant's claim fails. Defendant's argument
assumes that the plea bargain bound Lucero to lie on the stand or at least bound her to
refrain from elaborating on the truth.5 The record does not support that position. The
terms of the plea bargain, as represented to the trial court, were:
[PROSECUTOR]... Ms. Lucero will agree [that]... the State's version of the
facts, implicating the codefendant[,] is accurate, and t h a t . . . , if subpoenaed to
testify, [she will not]... testify that the codefendant is innocent.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] And her understanding - that is accurate, Your Honor.
Her understanding is she - while she's accepting this negotiation in exchange for this negotiation in exchange for her testimony, what she would say if called to
testify is that the version that the State has in the police reports is accurate as to
her involvement and that is all the testimony she would give, Your Honor.
(R. 235:4-5) (emphasis added) (in Add. B).
The agreement does not contemplate that Lucero would testify as to the accuracy
of the State's portrayal ofdefendant's involvement in the crime. Neither does it, on its
face, suggest that Lucero do anything more than tell the truth about her own involvement.

5

To the extent defendant is arguing that the State is without authority to ensure that
a co-defendant will provide truthful testimony by making it a condition of a plea
agreement, his claim fails. The challenged agreement would not impinge on any
recognized right because defendant has no right to present perjured testimony.
12
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Such an agreement is wholly appropriate and did not deprive defendant of the right to call
Lucero. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997) ("A plea agreement
requiring truthful testimony does not deprive a defendant of a potential witness or render
the testimony inherently unreliable"). The fact that the court, the prosecutor, and two
defense counsel, all present in open court at the time the plea agreement was presented,
saw nothing wrong with this condition and did not thereafter develop any more of a
record on it suggests that they all believed it to be an appropriate agreement designed to
have the witness testify truthfully about her own actions on the night in question.
Defendant provides no basis upon which to assume otherwise. Accordingly, even under
the plain error doctrine, the terms of the plea agreement were not obviously erroneous,
and defendant's claim of a state constitutional violation fails.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
PRESENT THE ARGUMENT TO THE TRIAL COURT AND DOES
NOT ARGUE PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY,
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
VERDICT
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.6
He claims that the evidence was too inconsistent to support a conviction and cites the

6

As stated in footnote 1, supra, defendant challenges only his conviction of
possession with intent to distribute. He does not challenge his conviction for interfering
with an arresting officer.
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absence of evidence linking the baggies of methamphetamine to him and the lack of
evidence that the officers could see what was happening in the dark. Br. of Aplt. at 11,
19. This Court should refuse to reach the merits of his claim because it is raised for the
first time on appeal. Alternatively, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
sufficient evidence existed to connect defendant and the drugs and to establish that the
officers could see defendant's conduct in the dark.
A.

The Insufficiency Claim has Not Been Preserved
Claims not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal absent evidence

of plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Hokate. 2000 UT 74, f 11; 404 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3. This includes claims of insufficient evidence. Id. at ff 14-17. Defendant
failed to raise below the two alleged deficiencies he briefs on appeal. Instead, he
repeatedly argued to the trial court in various guises his claims of perjury and ineffective
assistance of counsel (R. 35-38, 112-14, 119-20, 126-35, 141-42, 167-72). Even his posttrial motion for a new trial, which summarily claimed that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the verdict, failed to identify the alleged insufficiencies he briefs on appeal (R.
169-72). Further, defendant did not move to dismiss at the end of the State's case for lack
of a prima facie case.
Moreover, defendant makes no plain error argument to this Court. To establish
plain error for his claim of insufficient evidence, defendant would have to show not only
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but that the "insufficiency
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was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury." Holgate, at ^|17, No such argument appears in defendant's brief. Accordingly, this
Court should refuse to reach defendant's claim of insufficient evidence. See State v.
Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587-88 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to reach claim of
constitutional error for first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional
circumstances argument).
IL

On the Merits, There was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it will find sufficient

evidence to establish each of the points defendant claims are unsupported.
Under the plain error doctrine, defendant has the burden of establishing "first that
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting
the case to the jury." Holgate, at 1J17. This Court will find evidence to be insufficient
when, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, at ^|18
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). If this Courtfindsthe
evidence to be insufficient, it must then determine whether the defect was "so obvious
and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id.
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First, defendant alleges a lack of evidence linking him to the baggies of
methamphetamine found at the scene. Br. of Aplt. at 19. Contrary to his claim, there was
sufficient evidencefromwhich the jury could determine that he possessed the
methamphetamine with the requisite intent. Two officers saw him take baggiesfromthe
fanny pack he was wearing and give them to Lucero (R. 228:15, 46, 133-34). Two
baggies were found on the ground where the transaction occurred immediately after
defendant and Lucero were apprehended (R. 228:18, 86-87). Officer Melcher testified
that before defendant ran, she saw more baggies in defendant's fanny pack when he
removed the two he gave to Lucero (R. 228:45-47). All the officers testified that
defendant, Lucero, and the unknown white male took off in different directions (R.
228:16, 49-52, 76-77, 131). Detective Zaccardi, who was no more than 25 feet behind
defendant at the furthest, testified that defendant made several movements with his hands
at the front of his waistband during the chase (R. 228:85, 104-06).7 After defendant was
arrested and returned to the scene, Zaccardi found the fanny pack was empty (R. 228:86,
108). Shortly thereafter, officers found on the ground along the route defendant fled two

7

Defendant erroneously claims that "Officer Zaccardi testified he saw the
Defendant open up the fanny pack and drop two baggies, even as the chase was on and it
was totally dark." Br. of Aplt. at 18. Detective Zaccardi testified that "as we were
running he [defendant] kept putting his hands toward his waistband . . . . his hands kept
going down [to his waistband] and he would run and then his hands would go back." (R.
228:85). The Detective made it clear that he discovered the existence of the fanny pack
only after defendant was handcuffed (id.) and that he did not see defendant drop anything
during the chase (R. 228:103-06).
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baggies similar to the others found where the transaction occurred (R. 228:18, 48, 86-87,
109-10). From this evidence, the jury could infer that defendant had possession of some,
if not all, of the methamphetamine seizedfromthe scene.
Second, defendant contends that it was dark when he was arrested and that there
was no evidence to establish that the police officers used flashlights or had other means
by which to see what was happening in the dark.8 Br. of Aplt. at 19. The absence of
artificial light, however, does not mean that nothing could be seen. The evidence was
undisputed that it was dark when the arrest occurred. While the darkness made it more
difficult to see details, it did not make it impossible, as the testimony readily established.
The officers' testimony consistently portrayed the degree of detail which was
visible in the darkness surrounding defendant's arrest. The transaction occurred near
11:00 p.m. (R. 228:27-Melcher says around 11:00 p.m.; 228:103-Zaccardi says between
10:30 and 11:00 p.m.; 228:94, 112-Zaccardi says he wrote his report at the scene at 11:13
p.m. after everything was finished). Officer Melcher said it was just starting to get dark
when she saw defendant and Lucero walking toward her a block away (R. 228:15, 26-27).
By the time defendant ran, she explained that it was dark and she could see only dark
figures (R. 228:18, 25-26, 52, 60). In the interim, Officer Melcher was standing with

8

Despite defendant's claim that there "was no evidence which showed that any one
of the officers had a flash light or other mean[s] of illumination" (Br. of Aplt. at 19),
Officer Melcher testified that once they were alerted to the presence of numerous baggies
in the fanny pack, the officers began "looking with our flashlights for the drugs" (R.
228:18).

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant in a tight group of only four people, giving her the best vantage point from
which to see defendant's actions. She noted that she not only saw him remove two
baggiesfromhis fanny pack and give them to Lucero, but she also saw more baggies left
in the pack (R. 228:15, 42,45-47). Nothing in the evidence suggested that it was too dark
at that point in time for the officer to have seen defendant's actions from such an
advantageous vantage point.
Like Officer Melcher, Detective Zaccardi testified that it was just light enough to
see defendant and Lucero approach Officer Melcher (R. 228:71-74). However,fromhis
position in the front driver's seat of the car parked at the curb, he said that he could not
see the details of the individuals in the group or defendant's clothing as they walked
toward his car because of the fading light and the streetlight behind them, putting them in
shadows (R. 228:100-03). He consistently testified that he did not see defendant take
anything out of a pack or off his person or give anything to someone else, and he did not
know defendant was wearing a fanny pack until after he had handcuffed him (R. 228:85,
101-02). He was, however, able to tell when the group stopped next to the car, and he
saw Lucero hold up the baggies (R. 228:74). He also saw which way defendant ran and,
as he chased defendant, he was able to see defendant move his hands near his waistband
and away again but could not see anything dropfromdefendant's hands (R. 228:105-06).
He was able to follow defendant's flight, and saw him fall at the curb (id.). His testimony
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made it clear that, although it was hard to see individual detail in the darkness, he was
able to see shapes and outlines.
From a slightly different vantage point, Officer Smith was able to see a little more
before the chase began. He testified that his position in the back seat of Detective
Zaccardi's car was four feet from the group when they stopped next to the car (R.
228:127, 133). He was able to see defendant take something out of the fanny pack he was
wearing and hand it to the female with him (R. 228:129-30, 133-34).9 Smith was not
involved in the chase beyond the first few steps, so could add nothing relevant after that
point (R. 228:51-52, 76-77, 131).

,

Even defendant testified that he could see various things despite the darkness.
Nothing in his testimony contradicts the officers' testimony concerning their ability to see
various events in the darkness. Defendant claimed that he was walking behind Lucero
and Officer Melcher and that they were trying to get awayfromhim (R. 228:148, 166).
His testimony, if credited by the jury, establishes that it was light enough for him to see

9

Defendant mistakenly claims that Officer Smith testified that it was "so dark that
no witness could see into the vehicle he was riding in[,]" then proceeded to explain to the
jury how he was able to see defendant take baggiesfromhis fanny pack and give them to
Lucero. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. In fact, it was Detective Zaccardi who said that at the time
the four people stopped next to his car, it was difficult for him to see them which,
presumably, made it difficult for them to see him (228:103). Zaccardi also said he did not
see defendant reach into his fanny pack or take anything out of it or give anything to
anyone else (R. 228:98-102). His testimony is not internally inconsistent. Officer Smith,
on the other hand, had a slightly different vantage pointfromthe back seat of the car and
testified consistently as to what he was able to see and hearfromhis position four feet
from the group of individuals outside the car (R. 228:75,127, 129-30, 133-34).
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Officer Melcher's "body movements" and that they "startled" him (R. 228:167-68). He
saw Officer Melcher walking awayfromhim backwards" (R. 228:168), and,fromthe
comer of his eye, he saw Detective Zaccardi emergefromthe car at the curb, immediately
after which the chase began (R. 228:149). He also testified that while he was running, he
looked back over his shoulder, suggesting that he believed he could see someone behind
him if he looked, even in the darkness (R. 228:150). His own testimony supports the
inference from the officers' testimony that it was not so dark that they could not see
anything. On this evidence, the jury could well infer that the officers could see the basic
events about which they testified, despite the darkness. Accordingly, defendant's claim
fails on its merits.
POINTIII
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS DEFENDANT
PRESENTS AN INADEQUATE PREJUDICE ARGUMENT; EVEN
ON THE MERITS, DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS LACK RECORD
SUPPORT
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel, John Caine, allegedly failed to
adequately investigate the availability of prospective defense witnesses. Br. of Aplt. at
19-22. Specifically, he claims that defense counsel failed to investigate the possibility of
having defendant's sister-in-law testify that defendant did not have a fanny pack when he
left her house at ten that night, and the suspect sitting in Detective Zaccardi's car testify
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that it was so dark no one could see anything. Id at 21-22.10 He claims their likely
testimony was "critical" to the trial and that counsel was deficient for ignoring them. Id
at 22. This Court need not reach the issue on appeal because defendant presents
inadequate argument concerning the prejudice he suffered from counsel's alleged
deficient performance. Moreover, the claim fails on its merits because there is no record
support for the claim.
To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
"show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of
the trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)); see also State v. Gallegos,
967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998).
To establish the requisite prejudice, defendant must show that "but for the
deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result would have been
different." State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert,
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

10

Although defendant repeatedly asserted below that his trial counsel was
ineffective, he did so either in relation to counsel's failure to act on the allegedly perjured
testimony given at trial or in summary fashion, claiming a generic failure to investigate
witnesses without identifying any witness or testimony counsel failed to procure (R. 3538, 107-708, 112-14, 119-20, 129-39, 167-68, 169-72; 230:15-21, 26-28). Nowhere does
the record on appeal mention defendant's sister-in-law or the suspect in Detective
Zaccardi's car as possible witnesses or the substance of their anticipated testimony.
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to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah
1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct at 2068).
This Court need not reach the issue of deficient performance when the claim can
be resolved under the prejudice prong of the test. See State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195,
1199 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 807 (Utah App. 1998). In this
case, defendant has not argued prejudice from his counsel's alleged failure to investigate
and call the suspect who sat in Detective Zaccardi's car. Hence, that claim necessarily
fails. See State v. Seel 827 P.2d 954, 959 (Utah App. 1992) (the mere allegation of
prejudice is insufficient to permit review of a claim of ineffective assistance).
The only argument defendant makes as to the absence of his sister-in-law's
testimony is that, had she corroborated his testimony that he did not have a fanny pack
that night, "there would have been no evidence for the jury to find the Defendant guilty of
the information." Br. of Aplt. at 22. However, even if she had testified, as defendant
claims she might, that he had no fanny pack when he left her apartment that night, that
would not necessarily establish that he did not have one thereafter when he reached
Officer Melcher. Defendant was visiting his sister-in-law's house and may well have left
the pack in his car or Lucero may have had it as they left the apartment.
Moreover, such testimony would have left the jury with what it already had:
conflicting information as to whether the fanny pack existed. Given the testimony of
three officers as to the existence of the pack, Officer Melcher's testimony of its contents,
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Detective Zaccardi's testimony about defendant's arm movements during the chase, and
the subsequent discovery of bags of drugs along the route of defendant's attempted
escape, it is highly unlikely the jury would have found the facts any more favorably
toward defendant had his sister-in-law testified. It is farfromevident that the sister-inlaw's testimony would have changed the outcome of the jury's deliberations.
The same is to be said about the testimonyfromthe suspect in the police car. Even
if he had testified that it was too dark to see what was going on, his testimony would have
been contradicted by defendant's own testimony, which established that he could readily
see Officer Melcher's conduct, men emergingfromthe police car, and someone chasing
him as he ran down the street. Accordingly, defendant cannot establish the requisite
prejudice to prevail on his claims.
Even if this Court reviewed the merits of defendant's ineffectiveness claim, it
would find the claim to be without merit because the record is inadequate to support the
claim. Where the record underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
inadequate in any fashion, "ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, %% 17-18,

Utah Adv. Rep.

(dispensing with the preliminary inquiry

into the adequacy of the record).
In this case, the record is inadequate in two ways. First, there is nothing on the
record to establish whether or not defense counsel in fact investigated the witnesses
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defendant has identified. The mere fact that the record is silent as to whether an
investigation occurred does not establish that no investigation was in fact undertaken.
Hence, this Court should presume that counsel conducted a sufficient investigation to
determine that the witnesses were not necessary to presentation of the defense.
Second, the record does not reveal what the proposed witnesses would say if they
had been called to testify. Defendant implies that his sister-in-law knew that he had no
fanny pack the night of the arrest, but the record does not establish the fact and does not
demonstrate whether she was available or would, in fact, so testify. Defendant claims
that the other potential witness "could have been called," and defendant "feels" that he
would have testified that it was too dark to see anything. Br. of Aplt. at 21. However, the
record does not establish who he was, whether he was available, or what he would have
said on the subject. Consequently, on this record, this Court should presume that the
testimony of these witnesses was not material to the defense and that counsel was not
ineffective for failing to call them at trial. See Litherland, at 1J17.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.

4
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d??4Ly of October, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties:
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
knowingly and intentionally:
a third degree felony.
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
(c)
Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub(IXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
stance;
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
substance;
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
distribute; or
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
eligible for probation.
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
(a) It is unlawful:
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
greater
penalty
than provided in this Subsection (2).
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(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii),
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
guilty of a third degree felony.
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2Xa)(iii) is:
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
felony.
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
probation.
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterithan the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
narian, or other authorized person;
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa).
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg(5)
Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
B misdemeanor.
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
law.
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
another-state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
third degree felony.
or
substances.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the subunlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapherstances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
supervision.
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
Subsection (4Xb) if the act is committed:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
grounds of any of those schools;
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary instiner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
scope of his employment.
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii);
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985,
ch. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92,
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1;
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch.
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187,ft2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1;
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
ch. 163,ft3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198,
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1;
1996, ch. 1,5 8; 1997, ch. 64, ft 6; 1998, ch.
139, ft 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, ft 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former
Subsection (6) which read: "Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction
guilty of one degree less than the maximum

58-37-13

penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignating the other subsections accordingly.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence
of* for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and
(4).
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lKc), redesignating former Subsection (lKc) as (lXd), substituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic
change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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Ms. Lucero will plead guilty to an amended charge
of a possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony.

We don't have a problem doing that

by interlineation, by striking the enhancement and
the distribution within a thousand feet of the park
and distribution.

Instead, just saying that said

defendant possessed a controlled substance, to
wit:

Methamphetamine, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. SJOGREN:

Your Honor.

Ms. Sjogren?
That is the agreement,

And further, the State is of the

understanding that Ms. Lucero will agree to the
State's version of the facts, implicating the
codefendant is accurate, and that she will not
appear, if subpoenaed to testify, to testify that
the codefendant is innocent.
MR. MILES:

And her understanding --

that is accurate, Your Honor.

Her understanding is

she -- while she's accepting this negotiation in
exchange for -- this negotiation in exchange for
her testimony, what she would say if called to
testify is that the version that the State has in
the police reports is accurate as to her
involvement and that is all the testimony she would
give, Your Honor.
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